The article treats Davidson's consi derations on conceptual schem a tism. The first p art exam ines his general position. It includes rem arks about the dualism of schem e an d reality, about abandoning empiricism a n d re-establishing im m ediate touch with the world by linguistic means, an d it suggests that we should, following prof. D avidson's position, a b an don not only the idea of differing schemes, but as well the idea of a single scheme. The second p art discusses his m ain thesis, the assertion that intel ligibility implies having the sam e conceptual scheme. It is arg u ed that the bounds of intelligibility a re at the sam e tim e the bounds of our notion of rationality. And lastly, it denies that vicious circle of ascribing beliefs and u n d erstan d in g of sentences may be settled by general agreem ent of be liefs, a n d claim s that a relativist treats aliens m ore charitably.
Everyone who speaks any of the foreign languages, knows quite well how m any m isu n d erstan d in g s we m ight face, if we w ere not accustom ed to the very social use of all possible alien concepts. D ifferences in gender, num ber, voice m ight be over come all right, but nevertheless we m ight play gam es usin g am biguities of a fam iliar o r a n alien language. Therefore, everyone w ould agree, unless we do not accept all the rules of a foreign language, we m ight produce serious error. This very fact encou rag es the idea of d ifferen t conceptual schem es. People a re used to say th a t using a p a rtic u la r (natural o r theoretical) lan g u ag e accounts fo r the differences in opinions. Now, th e re m ay be no problem , since it is said, we all use the sam e logic, a n d we all face the sam e world. These facts led some philosophers to attack the very idea of a conceptual scheme. Thus, D. D avidson concludes th a t »in giving up the dualism of schem e a n d world, we do not give up the world, b u t re-establish u n m ed iated touch with the fam iliar objects whose antics m ake o u r sentences an d opinions tru e o r false«.1 »Of course«, says D. Davidson, »truth of sentences rem ain s relative to language, but th a t is as objective as can be«. Oxford 1986. p. 198. In the p resen t p a p e r I w ould like to discuss D. D avidson's considerations concerning conceptual schem atism . The first p a rt exam ines his g en eral position. It includes rem ark s about the dualism of schem e an d reality, ab o u t a b an d o n in g em piri cism a n d re-establishing im m ediate touch with the w orld by lin guistic m eans, a n d I suggest th a t we should, following D. David son's position, ab an d o n not only the idea of differin g schem es, but the idea of a single schem e as well. The second p a rt is the core of argum entation. I discuss his m ain thesis, the assertion th a t intelligibility im plies having the sam e conceptual scheme. I a rg u e th a t the bounds of intelligibility a re the b ounds of o ur notion of rationality. A nd lastly, I deny th a t vicious circle of ascribing beliefs a n d u n d e rstan d in g of sentences m ay be settled by gen eral ag reem en t of beliefs, an d claim th a t a relativist treats aliens m ore charitably.
It is beyond doubt, th a t D. D avidson arg u es ag ain st concept u al relativism , claim ing conceptual schem e to be a false idea. But in the end of his discussion, we m ight be su rp rised by the fact, th a t he is not a rg u in g fo r a single o r a com m on schem e or ontology. For he says: »It w ould be equally w rong to an n o u n ce the glorious news th a t all m ankind -all sp eak ers of language, at least -sh are a com m on schem e a n d ontology. For if we c an not intelligibly say th a t schem es a re different, n eith er can we in telligibly say th a t they a re one.«2 W h at is he proving, th en ? Are we sh arin g a com m on ontology o r not? Are we usin g d ifferen t schem es o r not?
W hat D. D avidson is up to, according to his own words, is to re-establish the un m ed iated touch w ith fa m ilia r objects. How are we to do it? By setting the tran slatab ility criteria fo r all possible languages. In o th er words, we get in touch with objects by using a language. Now, the first question is w h eth er by usin g a la n guage we establish the u nm ediated touch with objects, or is it ra th e r so, th a t w ords them selves re p re se n t som ething. Is it not so, th a t by using words, we alread y have a m edium , m ean s or in stru m en ts fo r representing. D. D avidson seem s to be aw are of this, since he speaks about antics of fa m ilia r objects th a t m ake o u r sentences tru e o r false. N evertheless, he assum es th a t antics pose no problem fo r getting in unm ed iated touch w ith objects. The second question is w hether th ere a re »fam iliar objects« at all, since he relinquished to an n o u n ce the glorious news fo r m ankind th a t th ere is a single, com m on ontology. The th ird question is w hether the tru th of sentences rem ain s relative to 2. ibid language only, as D. D avidson says, o r is it ra th e r so th a t the in d ependent objects, sense-data, experience o r w hatsever b e a r fo r the tru th too, as he im plies elsew here? For, w hat does this »rela tive to language« m ean? The assertion th a t the tru th rem ain s re l ative to language needs fu rth e r clarification.
Those questions have som ething to do with w hat D. David son calls »the th ird dogm a of empiricism«, i. e. with his ab an d o n ing of schem e -reality dualism . In th a t respect, th ere is a lim it ed n u m b e r of ontological possibilities. The first is realistic one. It considers language as a rep resen tatio n of the o u ter world. The tru th req u irem en ts seem to be twofold then: in d ep en d an t w orld on one side, an d linguistic rep resen tatio n s on the other. Only in th a t case m ay we speak of rep resen tatio n s as ad eq u ate o r in ad e quate. The second option I m ay call idealist. It asserts th a t we m ay not speak of the independence of the world. W hat we get from the world, o r even, w hat is the world, is alread y given in, or th ro u g h o u r linguistic categories. This assertion can be fo rm u lated in various ways, b u t probably the m ost p re g n a n t one is from W ittgenstein: »Das die W elt m eine W elt ist, das zeigt sich darin, das die G renzen d e r Sprache ... die G renzen m ein er W elt bedeuten.« Accordingly, w hat the w orld is, we can only intelligi bly say on the linguistic grounds. O r conversely, to use D. David son's words: »Nothing, however, no thing, m akes sentences an d theories true: not experience, not surface irritations, not the world, can m ake a sentence true.«3 D. D avidson obviously thinks, th a t we all speak a com m on language, the language of logic, a n d th a t o u r only task is to prove th a t it is really so. But I wonder, w hether the tru th of sen tences rem ain s relative to language only, o r is it as »objective as can be«. Because, then we have no ou ter criterion to find out w hether snow is really white, but only a coherentistic picture of truth, an d we have to depend on o u r belief that, th a t is really the case.
I am not proving th a t it is actually w hat D. D avidson has thought, b u t ra th e r th a t it is w hat we m ean w hen som eone says: »the tru th rem ains relative to language«. And th a t type of pic tu re seem s to be m ore subjective th en D. D avidson thinks.
But, it is surp risin g th a t D. D avidson criticizes the doctrine of conceptual relativism from this point of view. Since, it seem s th a t this doctrine is m ore plausible to those philosophers who take fo r g ran ted th a t the bounds (limits) of my w orld a re the '. ibid p. 194. bounds (limits) of my language. Such a philosopher would say: We move w ithin different w orlds because we speak different . languages. So o u r w orlds as well as o u r lan g u ag es a re incom m ensurable.
D. Davidson thinks th a t those differences of lan g u aes are just the differences in shape an d app earan ce, b u t not in th eir es sence. A nd their essence m ust obviously fit the world.
By a b an d o n in g em piricism , D. D avidson thinks th a t he is not giving up the world. But how do we get into un m ed iated touch with it, nam ely with »fam iliar objects«? Trough th eir antics. But how do we know w hether a sentence about the antic of a n object is tru e? C an we raise such a question, according to D avidson? The point is obviously th a t a n antic alread y is a rep resen tatio n of a n object, therefore, objects should not be considered so fa m iliar. In other words, if we (suppose legitimately) a b an d o n the d u alism of schem e an d reality, can we a b an d o n the dualism of a n object a n d its antic? W hat do we call fo r if we w ant to prove w hether the antic is a correct picture of a n object? W hen we a b an d o n the third dogm a of em piricism , we get a ra th e r interesting but dubious equation: a w ord (an antic) a l ready is a n object. There is no relatio n (»touch«) betw een one to the other, because they have to be the sam e thing, otherw ise the dualism still works. The described idealistic option now seem s to be m ore in the D avidsonian spirit.
But how did we get so diverse nam es fo r fam iliar objects? That is the question a n em piricist should answ er. W hat D. David son m ust answ er is th a t all those diverse nam es (antics) have the sam e m eanings. So it is not a n em piricist who needs translatability criteria in o rd e r to prove conceptual difference, since he m ight say: w herever nam es d iffer it will be m ore likely th a t the concepts will do so too. And the nam es can differ because they can express d ifferen t points of view (or describe d ifferen t aspects) of the sam e o u ter thing. Thus we get m any m eanings fo r the single outer thing. Since aspects of a thing are not to be eq u ated with w hat a th in g really is, it is intelligible th a t aspects m ay be incom m ensurable.
Therefore, the b u rd en of a rg u m en tatio n m ust be on D. D avidsons side. He m ust use internalistic m ean s to prove the ex istence of com patible sem antic rules. He m ust use tran slatab ility criteria to prove it. F urtherm ore, since he ab an d o n ed em piri cism, he m ust prove th a t there are aprioristic reaso n s why o u r notions in any language coincide not only with each oth er b u t as well with the m a tte r of fact. Now, this is quite a heavy task. A nd m aybe, w hen he realized into w hat kind of problem he en tered he wrote: »neither can we intelligibly say th a t they (schem es op. D.P.) a re one«. But the problem was not only to show th a t th ere is one conceptual schem e instead of m any, but th a t there is none. As we have seen, the idea of a (linguistic) schem e alread y p resupposes a dualism of schem e a n d reality which D. D avidson abandoned. So the fu r th e r problem would be fo r him to show th a t lan g u ag e is no con ceptual schem e at all. And it w ould follow not only th a t we have to ab an d o n the idea of various conceptual schem es, bu t the very idea of a schem e as well. (By the way, in criticizing the doctrine according to which language organizes som ething, D. D avidson forgot th a t the very idea of a schem e includes organizing som e thing.) And since a notion of schem e is still useful, I suggest to keep it.
It is w orth m entioning th a t in w hat follows we shall respect all lim itations D. D avidson has set to the d efen d er of conceptual relativism , a n d d isregards all the lines of defence which he con siders irrelevant. We shall th erefo re pass over such issues as taxonom ical differences, changing of m eanings, conditions of concept-building even not the failu res of translatability, nam ely all u su al types of arg u m en tatio n in fav o u r of conceptual relativ ism. W e shall just exam ine coherence an d consequences of D. D avidson's position.
Let us now consider, a p a rt from the th ird dogm a, his m ost convincing a rg u m en t ag ain st conceptual relativism . It goes this way: since th ere is no background on which to com pare co n trast ing schem es, the idea of differing conceptual schem es is not m eaningful. And th ere is no such background, because it would be intelligible at least fo r the one who does th e com parison. And if it w ere intelligible, it w ould belong to the sam e conceptual schem e. In o th er words, a backgroun d w ould be »a com m on core« of differing schem es. To m ake the whole a rg u m en t clearer let us say: fo r D. D avidson intelligibillity im plies h a v in g the sam e conceptual schem e. D iffering ideas m ight be wrong, strange, p erh ap s even irrational, but if we get any sense out of them , they would belong to »our« conceptual schem e. A nd they would have som e sense if we could som ehow u n d e rsta n d w hat they w ere about. How w ould we u n d e rstan d alien linguistic u t terances? By building tra n slatio n m an u als of the first (approxi mative) order, then by building a m a n u al of a second o rd er (more inform ative one) a n d so on." A fter a series of consecutive translations, in the end we w ould u n d e rstan d w hat a fo reig n er h as said. The outlasted difference w ould th u s not be a »concep-tional* one, but a difference in opinion. So, the intention of the a rg u m e n t is to reduce alleged conceptual differences to d iffer ences in opinions.
The a rg u m e n t declares th a t since th ere is nothing w hat could not be m ade intelligible in som e way o r the other, we sh are a single conceptual schem e. It stren g th lies in the fact, th a t we m ay not introduce gaps betw een tra n slated concepts an d m e an ings as a n a rg u m e n t fo r relativism , since we can alw ays ad d in telligible adjustm ents to m ake a foreign concept clearer. In th a t respect D. D avidson w ould subscribe to P u tn am 's critical rem ark directed to Feyerabend: to tell us th a t som eone has incom m ensu rab le notions, an d th en to go on a n d to describe them at length is totally incoherent.5 So, in o rd e r to refu te the arg u m en t, we have to prove th a t som e alien concept o r conception is a priori n o n translatable.
W hat is u n c lea r in the a rg u m en t is a d em arcatio n line b e tw een intelligibility an d unintelligibility. W hen would we say th a t som eone speaks quite unintelligibly? In cases of a p p aren t irrationality? No, since his u tteran ces have to be intelligible in a way to be called irrational. So they a re not unintelligible. And if th a t w ere so, both ratio n al an d irratio n al u tteran ces would form a single conceptual schem e. To avoid this paradoxical con sequence, D. D avidson h a s to introduce psychological m atters into a conceptual discussion.
Since we cannot in terp ret foreign words w ithout k n o w in g w hat th e y m ean, says D. Davidson, we have to k n o w fo rein g er' s beliefs. A n d we cannot k n o w what a fo reig n er believes i f we do n o t k n o w h is language."
So instead of solving the first paradox, he brings a n o th e r into play. O n my opinion, it form s a vitious circle. Som eone m ight wonder, how can a philosopher who tru sts in a total tran slatab ility re fe r to such a n argum ent. However, it serves d ifferen t needs, nam ely to prove th a t we have to assum e g en eral ag reem en t of beliefs. And a step fu rth e r will be a proof th a t we can n o t say w hen a fo reig n e r's e rro r is a consequence of differences of conceptual shem es an d not of beliefs.
C an we u n d e rsta n d irratio n al beliefs? If the an sw er is no, th en the sentences of a foreign lan g u ag e expressing irratio n al beliefs w ould not be intelligible. Therefore, according to D. Dav idson's thesis, they w ould not bi tran slatab le, a n d therefore, dif-5. P u t n a m , Hilary: Reason, Truth a n d H istory p. 114 *. ibid. 196. ferin g conceptual schem es w ould occur. If the an sw er is 'yes', th en we should face a problem how to u n d e rsta n d them . Since I consider rationality as a basis of in te rp re ta tio n an d u n d e r standing, the only option left is to draw a distinction betw een u n d e rstan d in g ra tio n a l an d irratio n al beliefs. Suppose now, th a t we can have a differen t m easu re of u n d e rstan d in g fo r the first an d the second type of beliefs. Those d ifferin g m easu res would define, practically speaking, com pletely d ifferen t u n d e rsta n d ings. So instead of having two distinct schem es, we w ould have two distinct notions of und erstan d in g . The difficulty w ould be re nam ed, a n d two types of beliefs w ould just have to be accepted. But, m e re ly by accepting that th ey exist, we cannot m a k e foreign beliefs a n d utterances intelligible. And since we cannot, we need som ething m ore fo r translation.
Suppose once a g ain th a t we w ere able to tra n slate anything, nam ely to m ake an y thing intelligible. W hen w ould we justifiably say th a t we u n derstood som ething m ade intelligible? C an we u n d e rstan d an ything intelligible? D. D avidson w ould say th a t we u n d e rsta n d an ything th a t is intelligible. But can we justify any thing intelligible? No, since there m ay be quite p ecu liar u tte r ances an d beliefs. For instance, th a t fo r every o u r belief B, a n alien believes non-B, an d fo r any o u r sentence S, he says non-S. Now, since we ab an d o n ed em pirical pro o f fo r credibility of be liefs a n d tru th of sentences, we have to g rasp the whole system of beliefs a n d linguistic utterances. W hat we im m ediately g rasp is th a t the alien system is diam etrically opposed to ours. And th a t is practically everything we thereby m ade intelligible. Now, consider a m an who u n d e rstan d s those two co n trad ic tory system s of lan g u ag e a n d belief, an d who h as no in d ep en d a n t evidence fo r th eir credibility. He w ould say S to a com pan ion, a n d non-S to a n alien, a n d he w ould explain his sentence according to the chosen system of beliefs respectively. W ould we say th a t he is using a single or a double system ? Those who w ould consider his behaviour a n d speech assu m in g th ere were a single conceptual schem e, would have to conclude th a t he be haves an d speaks irrationally. Only the relativist, with m ore wits fo r em pirical m atters, by considering him m ore charitably, and search in g fo r a system b e n ea th a p p a re n t irratio n ality would u n d e rstan d him. The anti-relativist h as m ade intelligible only the irrationality of the speaker. But of course, thereby he adm itted th a t he cannot u n d e rsta n d him, m oreover th a t he can n o t tell us why an d w hen he is irratio n al (for som etim es it seem s th a t he is not). The relativist, on the contrary, by insisting th a t his oppo n en t gave up too soon in explanation of fo reig n er's beliefs, an d supposing th a t o u r schem e is not necessarily the only one, would find out th a t a fo reig n er is quite rational.
There are two paradoxes (morals) in the story: 1. the p a ra d o x o f understa n d in g irrationality. If we assum e total translatability, th en both ratio n al an d irratio n al beliefs àn d sentences belong to the sam e schem e. A nd by definition we u n d erstan d just the ratio n al part. Thus w ithin a single schem e we would have intelligible a n d unintelligible part. Thus the assu m p tion of total translatability fails.
2. the p a radox o f charity. The definition says: total tra n s la ta bility (and its consequence -existence of a single scheme) a s sum es g en eral ag reem en t of beliefs, being thus very charitable. But the m ore we use total translatability, the sooner we will come to ascribe irrationality to beliefs. So the m ore we insist on total translatability, the less charitable we will be.
These considerations m ake a conceptual relativism som e w hat m ore a p p ro p riate to the m atter. Because ag ain st the oppo site idea, it was show n th a t either th ere a re u tteran ces an d b e liefs th a t cannot fit into a ratio n al o r intelligible com m on schem e, o r th ere a re different m easures of th eir intelligibility, th erefo re d ifferen t schem es in ap p ro ach to them . In both cases, intrinsic differences occur. C onceptual relativism takes adventage of them , an d calls them fo r the m a tte r of simplicity, con ceptual schemes.
In the first case, if irratio n al beliefs occur, it is likely th a t they will show up eith er as a system of beh av io u r o r as a system of concepts. A ccording to conceptual relativist, both types of sys tem s m ay be called a conceptual schem e. And since they are ir rational, they are different.
In the second case, if we use differen t m easures of intelligib ility in exam ining stran g e beliefs an d sentences, we can m ake them intelligible, b u t then we a re using d ifferen t types of con ceptual schem es. O ne fo r o u r concepts an d beliefs, a n d the other fo r the stran g e ones. Therefore, we have to ab an d o n the idea th a t by total translatability we ensure a com m on scheme.
7. To avoid this consequence (because it is a kind of proof th a t he cannot m ake anything intelligible), in o rd er to ascribe charitably a kind of intelligibility to such an irrational speaker, the anti-relativist needs now a new translation. W hat he needs is a translation m anual for irrational speakers. He needs a syste m atic criteria for translatin g irrational beliefs an d sentences into rational ones, to prove intelligibility. W hy does he w ant to prove intelligibility? To prove speak e r's irrationality. So, as a consequence of his translations an anti-relativist gets w hat he h ad in the beginning. As a m atter of fact he moves in a circle.
You m ay have noticed th a t I have not sep arated beliefs from concepts, an d schem atism from behaviour. There is a good re a son fo r it, nam ely to avoid a belief -concept paradox. My a s sum ption is th a t w here concepts differ, a beh av io u r will too, an d even m ore conversely. C onsequently, I am able to speak about different conceptual schem es even w hen considerable d iffer ences in behaviour occur. For instance, w hen drivers drive left side or right-side, it is likely th a t concepts of driving will change. W hen som eone h as a m otor-boat, a n d the o th er rows, it is likely th a t concepts of fishing will change. W hen som eone knows to read, an d the o th er does not, it is likely th a t th e concepts of com m unication will change etc. W e m ay introduce as m any behavi oural differences as we like. There is no reaso n not to tre a t b e havioral system s as any other. And of course, system can be reconstructed linguistically, as well. So the conceptual relativism does not lean on the linguistic arg u m en ts only. And the m ore em pirical differences we introduce betw een people an d betw een th e ir thoughts, the less we need the charity, principle. We would not be forced by the principle of charity, as D. D avidson thinks, but ra th e r by the b ro a d e r context th en lan g u ag e itself. G eneral ag reem en t would not be a startin g point, bu t ra th e r o u r objec tive.
If we pose such a big philosophical problem like a circle b e tw een u n d e rstan d in g beliefs a n d language, we can n o t move aw ay from it by saying: OK, then le t us start with beliefs.
The significance of o u r considerations is of g re a te r im port ance if one takes into account th a t we have used neither: 1. »failures of translation«, 2. n o r the principle of charity (at least in D. D avidson's sense an d context), 3. n o r the dualism of u n in te rp re te d content a n d scheme.
P erhaps the w eakness of the opposite conception proves conceptual relativism to be m ore intelligible an d stro n g er doc trine.
